Is professional conscience a matter of morality?

Abstract

The growing number of professions, referring to the "conscience clause" in order to evade legal obligations, has its source in the interpretation of the medical conscience clause proposed by the Constitutional Court. In my paper, I provide arguments for the claim that this interpretation is erroneous as grounded in an incorrect interpretation of the term "conscience" used in sentences about conscious exemptions. Instead, I suggest a reconstruction of the meaning of the term, which is in accordance with both international law and common intuitions regarding the role of conscience and morality in the specific professions or functions. At the same time, the meaning of "conscience" proposed in the paper excludes its use in reference to the private moral views of professionals. Thanks to this, the acceptance of the statement that every profession have the right to objection of conscience does not imply anarchization of the legal system and does not make it dependent on the moral views of persons performing specific professions and functions.